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ABSTRACT
Concepts of innovation in medicine are dominated by images of: (1)
scientific research, (2) generating fundamental knowledge, (3) leading to
radical and original invention. It is likely that medical device innovation
contradicts all three of those images. This paper integrates extensive
studies of nonbiomedical innovation, the few but growing numbers of
empirical investigations of biomedical innovation efforts, personal
experience over two decades with numerous large and small public and
private medically-related organizations, and a generous dose of
speculation.
Among my conclusions are that, even moreso than in other areas of
technology, significant innovation in medical devices depends upon:
(a) extensive interplay between industry and "lead users"/
developers from academic organizations (including teaching hospitals);
(b) individual entrepreneurs and the companies they spawn; and
(c) critical influences arising from FDA regulatory processes that
especially affect young small companies' financial requirements and
eventually their success and failure.
The large corporation in the medical device industry, moreso than in other
fields, is primarily an acquirer of technology that is newly emerging
outside of its own organizational boundaries, frequently through the
acquisition of young companies, and is an effective enhancer and
commercializer of existing technology. The recent increase in alliances
between innovative young smaller medical device companies and
resourceful larger firms appears to be beneficial to the corporate partners
as well as to society. The FDA seems to be appropriately motivated and
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directed, but in need of encouragement, both through increased human
resources and authorized flexibility in accepting non-U.S. data, to speed up
the Class III device review process, especially for smaller companies.
** **** ** ***
4Thank you for inviting me to help initiate this important meeting
aimed at better understanding how to invent, develop, and use new
biomedical devices. About five years ago Robert Levy, then the director of
the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, and I co-chaired a meeting
very similar to this one on a related topic, attempting to assess the state of
knowledge on the development, transmission, use and acceptance of
biomedical innovation. The other day I reread the proceedings book,
Biomedical Innovation (1), and, as I look forward to the sessions today and
tomorrow, I perceive that much progress has been made in the past five
years in our insights into these critical aspects of medical technology.
Today I am going to try to illuminate the process of technological
innovation in the biomedical device field by posing five questions. I would
love to be entirely empirical in my answers to these questions and show
you evidences drawn from medical device experiences as to what matters,
what works and what doesn't, and what are the problems in achieving
more effective innovation. But the field of medical devices has not been
researched as carefuly nor as thoroughly as one would have liked. Thus I
am going to draw upon some studies that have been done on innovations
outside of the medical devices area, on the few works that have been
carried out, particularly recently, on technological innovation in the
medical device field, on my own twenty years of relationships to this area,
and on some elements of pure speculation. On occasion you may have to
judge for yourself which of these sources is really being applied!
What is technological innovation in medical devices ?
In Figure 1 I list some typologies of innovation, all of which are
relevant to medical innovation. Product, manufacturing process and mode
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
of practice innovations are all important. New devices and modifications of
old devices are all included within the relevant area. Radical innovations
that introduce dramatic new capabilities occur, as well as incremental
innovations in those products and processes that have previously existed.
Invention that is wholly original indeed takes place. But innovation also
includes the adaptation of things that had come before but are now being
modified, upgraded and improved to fit new conditions. Innovation is also
adoption, taking something that someone else had previously done and
applying it in a different milieu. Another way of distinguishing among
innovations is that some are based upon science or research, where new
knowledge gets applied, whereas others are clear cases of engineering
problem-solving, applying primarily existing knowledge or techniques to
newly defined problems.
An overriding issue with these typologies is that I believe that our
thinking about innovations in the medical field is dominated by images
that come largely from pharmaceuticals. If most of us were pushed to
define what we mean by technological innovation in medical devices, I
think we'd tend to express notions about basic research, being carried out
in large organizations, generating fundamental new knowledge, being
applied to create radical device innovations. As a result any managerial or
policy-oriented ideas we generate no doubt reflect such images.
Yet my personal experience,. supported by the few relevant
innovation studies, indicates that the medical device field contradicts all of
the images I have just described. As my evidence will show, innovation in
medical devices is by and large engineering-based problem-solving by
primarily individuals or small firms, that is usually incremental in
character, that seldom reflects long periods of basic research, and that does
not in general depend upon recent generation of fundamental new
knowledge. Indeed it is a very different endeavor from drug innovation.
Figure 2 contains analyses of data gathered a number of years ago
on innovations in 77 companies in five different (all nonmedical) fields of
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activity. (2) In attempting to look at the amount of new technology and
technological change embodied in these innovations, my MIT colleague Jim
Utterback and the late William Abernathy of the Harvard Business School
clustered the data into three stages of evolution of technology. (3) Stage 1
technology was emerging new technology; Stage 2 was technology that was
in a phase of growth in terms of adoption and use in the field; and Stage 3
was mature technology, technology that was widely diffused and used. The
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6authors found the characteristics of technological innovation to be quite
different, depending upon the stage of development and use of the
technology. Note in Figure 2 that situations requiring real "invention"
dominated only the Stage 1 category of technological innovation. Much less
inventiveness typified innovations arising in Stage 2 and Stage 3
technologies.
This suggests that one of the first focusing dimensions is whether a
particular medical device field being considered is newly emerging in its
underlying technology, in which case we should indeed expect that a high
degree of technological change will be required, possibly true "invention",
perhaps providing real opportunity for research to play an important role.
Or is an area of medical devices being considered that is based on
technology well past the stage of emergence, where the technology is
rather well-founded, widely diffused, and where the technological change
needed is upgrading, enhancement, application, and the like?
A doctoral dissertation completed last year sheds light on this issue
from a small but randomly sampled set of 34 carefully studied British
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medical equipment innovations. Shaw (4) indicates that only 10 of the 34
innovations reflected a first time that the particular functionality was
provided to the equipment user. The other two-thirds cases of supposedly
representative meaningful medical device innovations involved market
failures or improvements on functionalities that had been previously
available. I believe that Shaw's findings may be generally true, that only
the small minority of medical device innovations bring a new functionality
to the physician or to the diagnostic user in the field.
In the same study Shaw attempted to code the sources of the key
technological information that was embodied in each of these innovations.
Only ten products were associated with original medical research. Here the
term "associated" is used quite loosely to also include all cases in which the
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
7innovation was developed in the course of someone carrying out medical
research; thus the ten cases were not necessarily devices that embodied
the research results. Clinical studies were certainly additional settings that
contributed vital information to equipment innovations. But development
work and engineering, more broadly stated, turned out to dominate the
technological sources that resulted in these medical device innovations.
This is not what I would expect to find were I documenting the sources of
key technology embodied in pharmaceutical innovations.
Who brings about medical devices innovations ?
It is quite commonplace in the field of innovation studies to talk
about the important relationship between the manufacturer and the user.
The correct and well-supported presumption is that when one focuses on
needs and carefully relates to the marketplace of prospective users, a
potential innovator comes up with much better insights as to what ought to
be developed and the resulting innovations turn out to be far more
successful.
However, one can go far beyond that rather simplistic
characterization. In many areas, and I assert that medical devices is one of
them, the user plays a much more substantial role than merely being a
source of helpful information (on his or her own needs) to a manufacturer
who then innovates. Frequently the user is the innovator. That innovative
user not only comes up with the identification of a need; he or she also
comes up with the solution to that need. The user develops the initial
solution, places the solution into first trial use, and often makes copies or
detailed specifications of the innovation available to other practitioners.
Only later, in many cases, does a manufacturer enter the picture by taking
on the user's innovation and engaging in the very serious and important
problems of commercial development, engineering for manufacturing and
for reliable field use and service, volume scale-up, etc. I am not trying to
minimize the producer's role, but I do want to illuminate from where the
innovation really comes in the first place.
My MIT colleague Eric von Hippel has performed a series of studies
on the sources of product innovations. His first four analyses, focusing on
areas of scientific instrumentation, relate well to the medical device issues
8we are discussing today.(5) Figure 5 notes that, despite very strict
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standards of what constitutes "domination" of an innovation, von Hippel
concluded that 80 to 100 percent of the key innovations in those categories
of scientific instruments were dominated by the user. To qualify as a "user
dominated" case, von Hippel insisted that the user had to have identified
the need, developed the technical solution, put the solution into practice,
and made the solution available to others in the field, all prior to a
manufacturer playing any role with respect to these activities.
With the von Hippel work as rather general background, let us look
further at the recently completed study of British medical innovation. (4)
Here in Figure 6 we observe results very similar to those found earlier for
the scientific instrument industry. In half of the British medical equipment
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cases, the innovation was based on a prototype developed and produced by
a user. In an additional third of the cases the idea was transferred directly
from the user, at the user's initiative, to the manufacturer, with the user
requesting that the manufacturer produce the device on behalf of the user
to solve the user's own recognized needs.
In only four out of the 34 devices was the innovation developed by
the initiative of a manufacturer performing market research in an area of
potential need to determine more detailed specifications of the nature and
magnitude of need, followed by actual product development to satisfy that
need. In one case, that we label here "pure technology push", the
manufacturer went forward without the benefit of market research to push
forward a technology that, internal to the manufacturer, was seen as
desireable. Perhaps only coincidentally that device was one of the six cases
of innovation failure in the study.
I codified further elements of the British data by going into the
detailed cases contained in the 450 page doctoral dissertation (with an
additional 500 pages of details blessedly withheld by Shaw from the
9document). As Figure 7 shows four of these innovative medical equipment
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users started their own companies to manufacture their innovations. In
another case a new company was established by a non-user who was in
contact with the users. In six cases the inventor of the innovation
contacted existing companies and asked them to develop and manufacture
his invention. In four more situations a user approached an existing
company, but the user hadn't yet invented the solution; the user only knew
what solution he wanted. In one case a government agency took the
initiative and selected a firm to develop the device. In seven cases the
existing relationship was one of ongoing long-term ties between an active
user doing work in a field of medical technology application and a company
also working in that field; these were cases of mutually supportive
relationships. In only fifteen percent of the products did the company take
the initiative of approaching a user for assistance in a particular area of
development. And in even fewer cases was the project initiated and
carried out internal to the firm, without benefit of user relationships.
One study by my MIT colleagues von Hippel and Finkelstein
showed that user innovation can be encouraged or discouraged by medical
equipment manufacturers.(6) They demonstrated that the "open design" of
the Technicon clinical auto-analyzer led to nearly all of its test procedures
being developed by users, whereas the "closed design" DuPont clinical
analyzer required total dependency on DuPont's internal R&D organization
for its supportive innovations.
My point in communicating all these detailed findings, which of
course might be somewhat different in a more comprehensive analysis of
U.S. medical device innovations, is that they paint a quite clear picture of
the locus of innovation in medical devices. The medical device innovation
process is dominated primarily by individuals (not firms), who are usually
in academic and/or clinical settings, involved in the development and use
of new technology in their respective medical fields. The role of the device
manufacturing company tends to be supportive and secondary, not
primary, with respect to most innovative products.
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For companies that are trying to innovate in medical fields it is
critical that they do relate closely to the clinical scene. I just finished last
year a research study of all new medical companies formed in
Massachusetts between the years 1970 and 1975. (7, 8, 9) My assistant
and I focused extensively on all of their activities in developing new
products, bringing them to the market, and succeeding or failing. As
indicated in Figure 8 one major finding was that the degree of clinical
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
contact between those companies and in particular teaching hospitals was
strongly correlated with the extent of technological innovation embodied in
the products that the companies developed. It is near impossible for a
biomedically-oriented company to perform effectively independent of that
clinical environment.
And yet, relating to academicians as potential sources of ideas is
not necessarily an easy pathway to innovation. To illustrate let me turn
first to studies that I did a number of years ago of M.I.T. faculty in three
departments --physics, electrical engineering and mechanical engineering.
Figure 9 displays what the faculty did with their own ideas that in their
judgments had the greatest commercial potential.(10) Despite the
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE
reputation of these supposedly aggressive and entrepreneurial M.I.T.
faculty, only about one-third took any strong steps in moving their ideas
which they felt were desireable and beneficial toward commercial transfer
and utilization. My studies of M.I.T.'s two largest research laboratories
replicated these findings. (11)
More recently I repeated these measurements in the academic
medical community, at two major medical centers in the Boston area, one
directly linked to a major medical school and the other a Veterans
Administration hospital. I studied 75 full-time physicians in terms of
similar issues -- their generation of ideas for new medical products or
practices and the extent to which they moved those ideas toward use. As
Figure 10 notes better than half of the physicians claimed to have come up
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with ideas that, if developed, would be worthwhile. Yet only about
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one-third of the "idea havers" tried to move those ideas forward toward
commercial transfer and utilization. Nineteen physicians out of the 44 who
had ideas did indeed engage in discussions with outside companies; nine of
them even entered into what they regarded as negotiations. Four
developed patent applications and one formed a new company to try to
commercialize the technological innovation. Academics, whether at
universities or in clinical settings, may be very productive in having ideas
but are only infrequently productive in exploiting them, regardless of
potential personal and social gain.
An important sidelight of these studies has indeed been the lack of
statistical correlation between the perceived potential benefits or
importance of these academic ideas and the extent to which they get
moved commercially. To a surprising extent somewhat routine academic
ideas with relatively little anticipated impact were as likely to get
transferred as were "great" ideas with prospects for potentially important
outcomes. The transfers depended more on the situation and the
idea-developer than on the quality of the idea itself. And this finding was
true both in the more general MIT faculty study we had done earlier as
well as in my more recent academic medical investigation.
My conclusion from all this is that the user is the principal driving
force behind most medical device innovations, either as the actual
developer and initial implementer or at least as the highly involved
link-pin to the innovating company. Yet unfortunately the data also
demonstrate that a high degree (perhaps most) of potentially valuable user
perspective and insight lies dormant in academia, in large part because the
traditional intended role of academicians has not included commercial
technology transfer and exploitation. This condition needs more careful
examination because the changing environment of the university,
especially as regards university ties to industry and the economy, may
make appropriate different forms of organizational relationships and
incentives that might cause a much larger fraction of academic ideas to be
moved forward.
12
Which companies contribute to medical device innovations?
What characterizes those firms that do innovate in the device
field? An earlier study of nonmedical innovation might again help to
develop perspective here. Figure 11 documents what many of you perhaps
already knew or suspected; namely, that in the emerging stage of a new
technology a number of small firms, e.g. ones selling less than ten million
dollars worth of products, dominate the corporate sources of innovations.
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Perhaps less appreciated is that the larger companies, e.g. those doing over
one hundred million dollars in sales, account for the bulk of the innovations
in the later stages of growth and development of a technology. I sense
general misunderstanding in this country and abroad of the relative roles
of different-sized firms in contributing to the innovation process. Much of
the loose talk about small companies being more innovative than large
should really be more precise statements that say small companies are
likely to be the ones who are innovative at very early stages of new fields.
Large companies as a group are more likely to be the primary innovation
sources at later large-market stages of fields of technology. And those
large companies that are particularly innovative have a special competitive
edge in dominating the later stages of an industry's evolution.
I believe the same phenomenon occurs in the medical technology
area, with important differences existing among different-sized firms in
the relative timing and type of their innovations. If these distinctions hold
true for the medical device industry, they are critical for policymakers,
since about fifty percent of U.S. medical device manufacturers have fewer
than twenty employees. In another doctoral dissertation (12) just
completed this past year at the M.I.T. Sloan School by one of my students,
John Friar, Friar focused on all of the major milestone developments that
were achieved in the diagnostic ultrasound field. The listing in Figure 12 of
accomplishments from 1963 to 1983 came from a very careful assessment
by experts in the field as to what were the major advances. In only two
cases, both by the same firm, Searle, did a large company initially develop
a key technological change. The three other cases in which companies are
13
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identified as the developers are all intriguing: Rohe Scientific, Diagnostic
Electronics, and Acuson were all essentially founded at the time of
development of the particular milestones that they then introduced to the
market.
Even when we focus on the role of market introduction, rather than
technical development, the small firm as innovator during the early stages
of a technology shows up strongly in the Figure 12 information. Physionics
was a new firm that licensed a University of Colorado ultrasound
technology development. Magnaflux was another new firm that licensed a
next important University of Colorado development. (There must have
been some interesting disputes within the faculty at Colorado.) Organon
Teknika, a major corporation, licensed a development that came from a
university in the Netherlands. And as indicated Rohe Scientific, Diagnostic
Electronics, and Acuson were all new firms that introduced their own new
technologies.
These limited data suggest that, as indicated previously, either
university or hospital employees, trying to satisfy their own needs as
clinical or diagnostic users, or the small innovating firm, is the primary
contributor to milestone developments in the medical device field.
Obviously I would have more confidence in this position if my database
were more widespread. But my consulting experience over the years,
bolstered by some related research in other countries (13), supports my
convictions here.
How does FDA regulation affect medical device innovation?
The demonstrated importance of the small firm to device
innovation highlights concerns raised by prior research about the impact of
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation. The recent study by
Birnbaum (14) of innovation in the area of X-ray technology showed that
increased FDA regulation has led to decreased invention of X-ray devices,
especially by smaller firms. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
study three years ago in the area of new contact lens innovations again
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expressed alarm that the small firm was especially affected by the FDA,
particularly in the emerging aspects of technology such as soft and
gas-permeable lenses. (15) But what must be understood here is that the
FDA does not act irresponsibly in this regard.
As someone who has had no particular interest in regulatory
issues, I was intrigued to find illumination of the FDA's role in the data
from my own recent study of Massachusetts medically-oriented firms. (9)
Indicated first in Figure 13 is that the risk associated with use of these
companies' new medical products, assessed by an independent medical
panel, correlates statistically significantly with the extent of new
technology, as well as with the first-of-a-kind use of a technology,
embodied in those products. This relationship held true for all of the
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companies' first products introduced to the market, their second products,
third products, as well as all of their products taken together. The more
new technology was embedded in a product, the greater the product's
perceived riskiness.
That medical risk also changed significantly among products
clustered as "medical supplies" in contrast with those in the device field in
further contrast with pharmaceutical products. As a product's category
moved along that spectrum, the perceived associated risk increased, as I
suspect your gut feel would support.
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What is somewhat comforting, especially to the skeptics among us,
is the indication in Figure 15 that the impact of FDA regulation correlates
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significantly with all of these independent measures of perceived risk
embodied in the product; the more medical riskiness in the product, the
more FDA intervention was sensed to be affecting the companies involved
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in developing and trying to commercialize the product.
I believe this is the right direction for FDA activity, but there is an
important downside effect. The introduction of the Medical Devices
Amendment in 1976 seems to have dramatically decreased the rate of new
product introduction by the young Massachusetts biomedical firms we
studied (9) and, though lacking further empirical evidence, I suspect these
findings would have been corroborated in a national sampling of young
medical firms. This heavy impact on the small firm's degree of innovation
and new product introduction leads to my next finding, shown in Figure 16.
Only in the medical field have I observed a negative correlation between
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the extent to which a young firm technologically innovates and the
economic performance of the company, contingent upon the extent of
financing of the company. In all the rest of my studies since 1964 of
technological innovation in young companies, I have found consistently a
direct positive relationship between the degree of its technological advance
and the success of the company. In the medical field, unless the company
is sufficiently well-financed to overcome the direct and indirect regulatory
costs, and especially the delays in being able to generate product revenues,
being technologically innovative may well be a curse rather than a benefit.
This is a serious problem for policy makers and managers to address.
My only suggestions here are to attempt to speed up FDA processes
to mollify the effects on the smaller firm, which suffers primarily from the
up-front costs needed to sustain itself during the time period needed for
marketing approvals. This speedup might be achieved via: (1) preferential
attention (but not different standards) to small company applications; (2)
increased human resources for the FDA review staffs; and/or (3) greater
flexibility in the acceptance of supporting data, especially from overseas
clinical trials.
What is the role of the larger company in medical device
innovation?
The previously cited comprehensive study of the ultrasound
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industry provides one basis for insights into the "big ticket" medical
electronics end of the medical device field. (12) As listed in Figure 17 nine
of the eleven largest companies in the business entered by acquiring a
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smaller younger innovator that had developed and commercialized some
ultrasound technology. In four cases the large company gained additional
competitive technology by further acquisitions, although in a couple of
cases the larger firm had originally entered the field based on its own
internal technological developments. I note with interest that the only
Japanese company in the list, Toshiba, entered the ultrasound field on its
own and didn't acquire outside technology as a major element of advancing
its market position, a situation in contradiction to our usual stereotype of
Japanese technology acquisitive behavior.
If the larger company's role in medical devices is only the
acquisition of outside firms and outside technological innovations, and if in
addition the large company doesn't do anything important in the medical
device industry, then perhaps we could focus all of our attention on the
smaller firm. But, fortunately or not, as Figure 18 shows, the large
company clearly dominates the industry in terms of sales. Most of the
INSERT FIGURE 18 HERE
companies in the ultrasound industry, possibly representative of other
medical device markets too, are quite small, 67 percent of them doing less
than five million dollars each in sales. Only twenty percent of the firms do
more than ten million dollars in sales, but the four largest companies have
53 percent of the total U.S. market. We end up observing tremendous sales
concentration by the largest companies, who were not the original principal
sources of these medical device innovations and who, for the most part,
acquired their technological base either by licensing or by acquiring an
innovating firm. My own device-related entrepreneurial experiences in
areas ranging from clinical diagnostics to medical information systems
replicates the ultrasound situation: young small firms have dominated the
initial major innovations, and large companies have advanced by-and-large
through later acquisition of the innovating firms.
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Consequently the large and the small firms in the medical devices
field play quite different roles. The smaller firm is more frequently the
early stage innovator, and is most jeopardized by the regulatory process.
The large firm can afford the regulatory bill, but is less likely to be affected
anyway due to the large company's less pronounced activity as a key
innovator. The patterns described here suggest that we need to look
carefully for potential synergistic relationships between large and small
companies in the medical device industry. In Figure 19 1 enumerate a
variety of potential ties that need to be assessed and perhaps fostered.
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Those ties range from sponsored research to venture capital to acquisition
to alliances of all sorts. These relationships have been multiplying rapidly
in the biotechnology as well as in the medical devices fields, especially in
recent years. As illustrated in Figure 20, the recent British study (4)
showed a significant extent of joint forms of collaboration between users
and manufacturers, or small companies and larger ones.
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I believe that the potential benefits, to all companies involved as
well as to society, of strategic and tactical alliances between large and small
companies are particularly promising in the medical devices field. The
evidences already cited demonstrate that the primary roles of the firms
differ greatly as a function of their size. The younger smaller company
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primarily offers advanced medical device technology and the
entrepreneurial drive and commitment needed to launch a new technology
into its initial use and early stage market development. But the large
company offers various and different kinds of resources: money,
manufacturing capability, well-organized channels of distribution and field
service, understanding of how to deal with regulatory issues posed by the
FDA, the opportunity to bridge across and potentially integrate multiple
11
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areas of technology. Furthermore, the large company contributes the
-potential of well-organized continuing streams of incremental technological
improvements during the growth and later stages of maturation of diferent
device technologies.
More explicit policy attention seems justified to strengthen these
mechanisms of on-going relationships between large and small firms in
medical device fields. Areas for review might include: (1) the extent of and
criteria for government research funding such as the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program; (2) tax treatment of expenses
incurred in these collaborative endeavors; and/or (3) possible government
funding of stages beyond research, such as product development and
market applications research. Programs along these lines exist in several
countries that are trying to foster industrially competitive innovation.
Going one step further, strengthening ties between universities and both
large and small companies might also enhance the rate of medical device
innovation and the forward movement of that innovation toward socially
beneficial use.
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TYPOLOGIES OF INNOVATION
PRODUCT. , PROCESS, PRACTICE
NEW vs. MODIFICATION
RADICAL vs. INCREMENTAL
INVENTION, ADAPTATION, ADOPTION
vs. ENGINEERING
Figure 1.
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE EMBODIED
SUCCESSFUL INNOVATIONS *
DEGREE OF
INVENTIVENESS
LITTLE
% DISTRIBUTION #
STAGE 1
14
STAGE 2
19
STAGE 3
33
CONSIDERABLE
"INVENTION" REQUIRED
41
45
100
#X 2 = 19.1, p<0.001
* Original data from Myers and Marquis, 1969 (2). Analysis from Utterback
and Abernathy, 1975 (3).
Figure 2. IN
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19
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DEGREE OF FUNCTIONAL ADVANCE EMBODIED
IN BRITISH MEDICAL EQUIPMENT INNOVATIONS *
EXAMPLE
FIRST TIME PROVIDED
TO EQUIPMENT USER
MAJOR IMPROVEMENT
IN FUNCTIONALITY
MINOR IMPROVEMENT
FAILURE
TOTAL
10
8
10
6
NEONATAL OXYGEN
MONITORING SYSTEM
RADIO PILL TELEMETRY
SYSTEM
MINIATURIZATION OF
RADIOGRAPHY EQUIP.
NASAL AIRWAYS
RESISTANCE TESTER
34
* Data from Shaw, 1986 (4).
Figure 3.
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Figure 4. TECHNOLOGICAL SOURCES OF IDEAS FOR
BRITISH MEDICAL EQUIPMENT INNOVATIONS*
ASSOCIATED WITH ORIGINAL
MEDICAL RESEARCH
OTHER CLINICAL STUDIES
DEVELOPMENT & ENGINEERING
10
5
19
34
* Shaw, 1986 (4).
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Figure 5. USER DOMINATION OF INSTRUMENT INNOVATIONS *
CATEGORY OF % # #
INSTRUMENTS USER USER MFG.
GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY 82 9 2
NUCLEAR MAGNETIC
RESONANCE 79 11 3
ULTRAVIOLET
SPECTROPHOTOMETRY 100 4 0
TRANSMISSION ELECTRON
MICROSCOPE 79 11 3
* von Hippel, 1976 (5).
III
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Figure 6. USER / MARKET DETERMINATION OF -
BRITISH MEDICAL EQUIPMENT INNOVATIONS *
BASED ON USER PROTOTYPE
IDEA TRANSFERRED FROM USER
MARKET RESEARCH BY MANUFACTURER
TECHNOLOGY PUSH BY MANUFACTURER
TOTAL INNOVATIONS
18
11
34
* From Shaw, 1986. (4)
4
1
III
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Figure 7. USER vs. MANUFACTURER INITIATIVES
IN BRITISH MEDICAL EQUIPMENT INNOVATIONS*
NEW COMPANY SET UP BY USER
NEW COMPANY SET UP BY NON-USER
EXISTING COMPANY APPROACHED BY INVENTOR
EXISTING COMPANY APPROACHED BY USER
COMPANY SELECTED BY GOVERNMENT AGENCY
ON-GOING TIES BETWEEN COMPANY AND
ACTIVE USER
COMPANY APPROACHED ACTIVE USER
PROJECT INITIATED INTERNALLY WITHIN
COMPANY
TOTAL INNOVATIONS
* Data derived from Shaw, 1986 (4).
4
1
6
4
1
7
5
4
34
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Figure 8. YOUNG BIOMEDICAL FIRMS
WITH CLINICAL CONTACTS (19 OUT OF 26)
HAD MORE INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS *
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INNOVATION AND
CLINICAL CONTACT
PRODUCT ATTRIBUTE
NEW TECHNOLOGY OR
FIRST OF ITS KIND
SPECIAL PURPOSE SPECIFICATIONS
CALIBRE OF PRODUCT
OR PERSONNEL
(MANN-WHITNEY PROBABILITY)
0.02
0.03
0.05
* Roberts and Hauptman, 1986 (7).
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ACADEMICIANS' EXPLOITATION OF
THEIR COMMERCIALLY-ORIENTED IDEAS *
DEGREE OF COMMERCIAL
EXPLOITATION
NONE
WEAK
STRONG
ACADEMIC
32
10
26
TOTALS
* Roberts and Peters, 1981 (10).
Figure 9.
IDEAS
47
15
38
68 100
III
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Figure 10. LOW RATE OF IDEA EXPLOITATION
BY ACADEMIC PHYSICIANS
PHYSICIANS SAMPLED 75
CLAIMED PRODUCT OR PRACTICE IDEAS 44
"ATTEMPTED" COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION 19
DISCUSSED WITH OUTSIDE COMPANY 19
NEGOTIATED WITH OUTSIDE COMPANY 9
WROTE PATENT APPLICATION 4
FORMED OWN COMPANY 1
III
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Figure 11. FIRM
AS A
SIZE AND SUCCESSFUL INNOVATION,
FUNCTION OF STAGE OF TECHNOLOGY
(N = 77)
STAGE OF EVOLUTION OF
TECHNOLOGY
SIZE OF FIRMS
(SALES $x106 )
UNCLASSIFIED +
<10
10- 100
> 100
STAGES II AND III
+ "Unclassified" firms are private companies that
data; they are all assumed to be doing less than $1
refused to provide sales
0 million in sales.
X 2 = 11.2, p < 0.01
* Original data from Myers and Marquis,
Utterback and Abernathy, 1975 (3).
1969 (2). Analysis from
*
STAGE I
O/o
12
18
6
16
23
34
12
31
8
0 (?)
2
15
32
0
8
60
32
Figure 12. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES
IN DIAGNOSTIC ULTRASOUND *
YEAR MILESTONE
1963 COMMERCIAL 2-D
SCANNING
1969 MECH. REAL TIME
1972 ELEC.-SWITCHED
REAL TIME
1973 STORED GRAY SCALE
1975 ELECTRONIC FOCUS
1976 MICROPROCESSOR
CONTROLS
1977 DIGITAL SCAN CONV.
1983 COMPUTED
SONOG RAPHY
TECHNICAL
DEVELOPER
U. OF COLO.
U. OF COLO.
DUTCH MED.
RESEARCHERS
ROHE SCIENT.
DIAG. ELECT.
SEARLE
ULTRASOUND
SEARLE ULTR.
ACUSON
MARKET
INTRODUCTION
PHYSIONICS
MAGNAFLUX
ORGANON
TEKNIKA
ROHE SCIENT.
DIAG. ELECT.
SEARLE
ULTRASOUND
SEARLE ULTR.
ACUSON
* Friar, 1986 (12).
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Figure 13. RISK ASSOCIATED WITH USE
CORRELATES WITH EXTENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
OR FIRST-OF-A-KIND OF BIOMEDICAL PRODUCTS +
CORRELATION
FIRST PRODUCT
SECOND PRODUCT
THIRD PRODUCT
0.34 **
0.45
0.33*
* < 0.10; P < 0 .0 5
+ Hauptman and Roberts, 1987 (9).
III
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Figure 14. RISK ASSOCIATED WITH USE
INCREASES AS PRODUCT AREA SHIFTS
FROM "AUXILIARY / SUPPLIES" TO "MEDICAL DEVICES"
TO "DRUGS / PHARMACEUTICALS" *
PROBABILITY
FIRST PRODUCT 0.005
SECOND PRODUCT 0.05
THIRD PRODUCT 0.10
FIRM AVERAGE 0.005
* Hauptman and Roberts, 1987 (9).
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Figure 15. IMPACT OF FDA REGULATIONS
CORRELATES WITH RISK ASSOCIATED WITH USE
OF YOUNG BIOMEDICAL FIRMS' PRODUCTS +
SPEARMAN & PEARSON
CORRELATIONS
OVERALL
IMPACT EXPENSES
FIRST PRODUCT
SECOND PRODUCT
THIRD PRODUCT
FIRM AVERAGE
0.35
0.29
0.14
0.32
p<0.10; p<0.05
+ Hauptman and Roberts, 1987 (9).
0.20
0.32
0.51 **
**0.47
111
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Figure 16. NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
BIOMEDICA
FOR POORLY FINANCED
L FIRMS (N=20) +
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS
DIMENSIONS OF TECH.
INNOVATION
ANNUAL SALES
1980-83
ESTIMATED 1983
MARKET VALUE
NEW TECHNOLOGY OR
FIRST OF ITS KIND
SPECIAL SPECIFICATIONS
OR PURPOSE
CALIBRE OF PRODUCT
OR PERSONNEL
PEARSON CORRELATIONS:
p<0.10; p < 0.05;
+ Hauptman and Roberts, 1987 (9).
**
-0.47 -0.35
**
-0.44 -0.33 *
-0.60 -0.44
p < 0.01
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Figure 17. LARGE FIRM USE OF TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION
IN DIAGNOSTIC ULTRASOUND
COMPANY
ACQUISITION
FOR ENTRY
ACQUISITION
FOR TECHNOLOGY
COLGATE-PALM.
GE
MEDASONICS
ELECTRO PHYSICS J&J ULTRASOUND
PICKER (PHYSIONICS)
EKOLINE
TECHNICARE (UNITED) IREX, ECHO LABS
ROHE
GRUMMAN
RORER
SIEMENS
SONOMETRICS
SEARLE
ATLSQUIBB
TOSHIBA
ADR
* Friar, 1986 (12).
GEC
H-P
J&J
PHILIPS
ROCHE
III
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Figure 18. ESTIMATED 1986 SALES DISTRIBUTION
OF U.S. ULTRASOUND MARKET *
SALES IN $ MILLIONS
LESS THAN 5
>5 BUT <10
GREATER THAN 10
% OF COMPANIES
67
13
20
BUT 4 LARGEST FIRMS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE 53 %
OF THE U.S. MARKET.
* Friar, 1986 (12).
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Figure 19. POSSIBLE TIES BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL
FIRMS TO ENHANCE INNOVATION
IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY
SPONSORED RESEARCH
VENTURE CAPITAL AND VENTURE NURTURING
ACQUISITIONS ??
ALLIANCES
11
40
Figure 20. USER- MANUFACTURER COLLABORATIONS IN
BRITISH MEDICAL EQUIPMENT INNOVATIONS *
(N = 34 CASES)
JOINT PROTOTYPE
EVALUATION &
TESTING & PRODUCT
MARKETING
JOINT PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT &
PRODUCT MARKETING
JOINT PROTOTYPE SPECIFICATION &
MARKETING
* Shaw, 1986 (4).
25
19
13
41
Figure 21. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ALLIANCES
IN THE MEDICAL DEVICES INDUSTRY
BASE VENTURES ON COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF
SMALL AND LARGE COMPANIES
SMALL COMPANY
- ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
- ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMITMENT AND FLEXIBILITY
LARGE COMPANY
-CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION, SALES, SERVICE
-ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND OTHER CRITICAL
RESOURCES
III
